The Economics of Adaptation to Extreme Weather Events in Developing Countries by Brian Blankespoor et al.
Working Paper 199
January 2010
The Economics of Adaptation 
to Extreme Weather Events in 
Developing Countries
Abstract
Without international assistance, developing countries will adapt to climate change as best they can.  Part 
of the cost will be absorbed by households and part by the public sector.  Adaptation costs will themselves 
be affected by socioeconomic development, which will also be affected by climate change.  Without a better 
understanding of these interactions, it will be difficult for climate negotiators and donor institutions to 
determine the appropriate levels and modes of adaptation assistance.  This paper contributes by assessing 
the economics of adaptation to extreme weather events.  We address several questions that are relevant for 
the international discussion:  How will climate change alter the incidence of these events, and how will their 
impact be distributed geographically?  How will future socioeconomic development, notably an increased focus 
on education and empowerment for women and girls, affect the vulnerability of affected communities?  And, 
of primary interest to negotiators and donors, how much would it cost to neutralize the threat of additional 
losses in this context?  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Without international assistance, developing countries will adapt to climate change as 
best they can.  Part of the cost will be absorbed by households and part by the public 
sector.  Adaptation costs will themselves be affected by socioeconomic development, 
which will also be affected by climate change.  Without a better understanding of these 
interactions, it will be difficult for climate negotiators and donor institutions to determine 
the appropriate levels and modes of adaptation assistance.  This paper attempts to 
contribute by assessing the economics of adaptation to extreme weather events.  We 
address several questions that are relevant for the international discussion:  How will 
climate change alter the incidence of these events, and how will their impact be 
distributed geographically?  How will future socioeconomic development affect the 
vulnerability of affected communities?  And, of primary interest to negotiators and 
donors, how much would it cost to neutralize the threat of additional losses in this 
context?   
 
From a narrow technical perspective, it might be desirable to address the latter question 
with a detailed engineering cost analysis of specific disaster prevention measures.  
However, as we show in the paper, existing cross-country information about relevant 
emergency preparedness programs is far too sparse to support systematic analysis and 
projection.  And in any case, we believe that the effectiveness of such measures is 
contingent on the characteristics of the communities that employ them.  We therefore 
adopt an alternative approach in this paper, focusing on the role of socioeconomic 
development in increasing climate resilience.    
 
Our analysis builds on empirical work and case studies that have documented the role of 
socioeconomic development in reducing vulnerability to climate shocks.  Horwich 
(2000), Tol and Leek (1993), Burton, et al. (1993) and Kahn (2005) have focused on the 
effect of rising income per capita:  As communities get richer, they have greater 
willingness and ability to pay for preventive measures.  Kahn (2005) finds that the 
institutional improvement that accompanies economic development also plays a 
significant role, through enhanced public-sector capability to organize disaster prevention 
and relief.   
 
Other work focuses on the role of political and human development.  Albala-Bertrand 
(1993) identifies political marginalization as a source of vulnerability to natural disasters  
Toya and Skidmore (2005) find a significant role for education in reducing vulnerability, 
through better choices in areas ranging from safe construction practices to assessment of 
potential risks.  Recently, Oxfam International (2008) has drawn on extensive evidence 
from South Asia to highlight the particular vulnerability of women, who often suffer far 
greater losses than men in natural disasters: 
 
Nature does not dictate that poor people, or women, should be the first to 
die. Cyclones do not hand-pick their victims. Yet, history consistently shows 
that vulnerable groups end up suffering from such events disproportionately 
… In the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone, for example, four times more women   2 
died than men … Disasters are therefore an issue of unsustainable and 
unequal development at all levels …(Oxfam (2008), p. 1) 
 
A logical inference from Oxfam (2008), Albala-Bertrand (1993) and Toya and Skidmore 
(2005) is that empowering women through improved education may be a critical factor in 
reducing families‟ vulnerability to weather-related disasters. This would also be 
consistent with the extensive literature that documents the powerful effect of female 
education on community-level social capital and general welfare measures such as life 
expectancy (King and Mason, 2001).   
 
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical research has focused on female education as a 
potentially-critical determinant of vulnerability to extreme weather events.  Assessing its 
importance and implications is a core feature of this paper.  Drawing on an econometric 
analysis of panel data, we address two key questions: As climate change increases 
potential vulnerability to extreme weather events, can expanding female education 
neutralize this increased vulnerability?  If so, how much would it cost?    
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a summary of 
losses from extreme weather events in developing countries during the period 1960-2006.  
In Section 3, we review recent projections of climate impacts, economic growth and 
demographic change.  We focus particularly on projections by integrated assessment 
models that incorporate links between climate change and economic activity.  Section 4 
specifies a set of risk equations for weather-related disasters and estimates them by fixed-
effects.  In Section 5, we develop country-specific projections for female education.  
Section 6 uses our econometric results and education projections to forecast future risks 
under alternative assumptions about climate change.  In Section 7, we use these 
projections to estimate the cost of reducing future weather-related risks through more 
intensive investment in female education.  Section 8 summarizes and concludes the 
paper.    
 
2.  Losses from Extreme Weather Since 1960 
 
The most comprehensive data on weather-related losses are maintained by the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health of the 
Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels.
1  For developing countries
2, the CRED data 
provide a sobering view of weather-related losses since 1960.  Table 1 presents the 
numbers of people killed and affected by floods and droughts by decade.  Flood-related 
deaths rose steadily from 17,000 in the 1960‟s to over 58,000 in the 1990‟s.  Droughts 
killed far more people, although their impact was heaviest in the 1960‟s (1.5 million 
                                                 
1  To be entered in CRED‟s EM-DAT database, a natural disaster must involve at least 10 people reported 
killed; 100 people reported affected; the declaration of a state of emergency; or a call for international 
assistance.  Recorded deaths include persons confirmed as dead and persons missing and presumed dead. 
Total affected persons include people suffering from disaster-related physical injuries, trauma or illness 
requiring medical treatment; people needing immediate assistance for shelter; or people requiring other 
forms of immediate assistance, including displaced or evacuated people. 
2  We define these as countries identified by the World Bank as Low Income or Lower Middle Income.   3 
deaths) and basically absent in the 1990‟s (800 deaths).  Aside from those killed,  floods 
and droughts affected huge numbers of people who were injured, made homeless, or 
forced to seek emergency assistance.  Trends for persons affected parallel the trends for 
deaths: rising for floods, but not for droughts. 
 
To understand this phenomenon better, it is useful to separate losses into their two 
components:  risk of loss (total losses/population) and population.  The latter component 
increased rapidly in developing countries, from 2.2 billion in 1961 to 4.7 billion in 2000.  
Figures 1a-d provide graphical evidence on the risk component.  For floods, the trends in 
risk of being killed or affected are clearly positive, while no trend is apparent for 
droughts.  Figures 1a-d show that the risk series for floods and droughts are very 
different.  Floods exhibit roughly continuous behavior through time, while droughts have 
exhibited huge, rare pulses that have not recurred since the early 1980‟s.  The sources of 
these pulses are provided by Table 2, which presents the worst nine cases of drought-
related death since 1960.  Truly catastrophic losses of life in droughts in previous decades 
have been limited to four countries: India (1.5 million total), Ethiopia (600,000), Sudan 
(150,000) and Mozambique (100,000).      
 
To summarize, losses from flooding have increased markedly since 1960 for two reasons:  
The risk of loss has increased significantly, and the population subject to risk has more 
than doubled.  Droughts present a very different case, with risks dominated by 
catastrophic events in a few countries decades ago, and no clear overall trend.  Even with 
rapidly-increasing population, there is no clear upward trend in persons affected by 
drought (Figure 2).  Nevertheless, as Table 1 and Figure 2 show, the number of people 
affected by droughts continues to be huge. 
 
3. What Lies Ahead 
 
Our approach to impact forecasting incorporates projected socioeconomic and 
demographic trends as well as climate change.  This requires us to adopt internally-
consistent assumptions about future changes in emissions, economies, human 
development levels and populations.  The emissions scenario leads to a forecast of 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere, which is related to changes in global and 
local climate through one of a large number of global circulation models (GCMs).  For 
the economic forecast, we draw on a recent summary of integrated assessment models by 
Hughes (2009), who draws on a critical assessment of the IPCC‟s SRES scenarios by Tol, 
et al. (2005).  Hughes develops a consensus economic projection by taking an average 
growth rate from five integrated assessment models.  We use Hughes‟ constant-dollar 
GDP series, because our econometric risk estimation requires the use of data extending 
back to 1960.  For the population forecast (which includes projections of life 
expectancies and total fertility rates), we use the UN‟s Medium Variant Projection (2006 
Revision).  Because our economic projections incorporate interactions with projected 
climate change, they are moderate in their view of future prospects.  Overall, the   4 




We attempt to bound the set of reasonable expectations about future climate using GCMs 
with strongly-contrasting predictions.  Within the SRES A2 scenario, the GCMs provide 
a relatively uniform view of future increases in temperature.  However, this is not the 
case for precipitation which, as we will show in the following section, is closely related 
to losses from floods and droughts.  To provide a sense of what is possible from the 
current scientific perspective, our projections use two GCMs that are the wettest and 
driest of approximately 20 available GCMs at the global level.  The driest overall is 
CSIRO‟s Mk 3.0 model, which was transmitted to the IPCC‟s data collection center in 
2005.
4  The driest is NCAR‟s Community Climate System Model (CCSM), version 3.0, 
which was released to the public in 2004
5 
 
To illustrate the implications of the forecasts, Figure 3 provides historical and projected 
data for India for income per capita, population, life expectancy, fertility, mean annual 
rainfall, and maximum (monthly) annual temperature.  We include both the CSIRO and 
NCAR weather projections.  It is immediately clear that the India of 2050 bears little 
resemblance to present-day India, even in our relatively moderate scenario.  GDP grows 
at an annual rate of 4.4%, increasing GDP per capita (constant $US 2000) from $450 in 
2000 to $4,300 in 2050.  Life expectancy increases from 63 to 76 years and the total 
fertility rate declines from 3.25 to 1.85 (below replacement).  In 2050, India is an upper 
middle income country by current World Bank standards, closely resembling the Chile of 
2000 in income per capita, life expectancy and fertility.  But not, of course, in population:  
By 2050, India has 1.66 billion people in this scenario. 
 
The climate projections provide a sense of the disparities in GCM predictions associated 
with the IPCC A2 scenario.  From a monthly average of 88 mm in 2000, precipitation 
increases 8% by 2050 to 95 mm in the NCAR scenario, and decreases by 8% to 81 mm in 
the CSIRO scenario.  Thus, the total difference attributable to GCM variation within the 
same IPCC scenario is 16% -- a very large number in this context.  The two scenarios are 
much closer on mean monthly temperature. After an increase of 1° C. since 1970, both 
predict another increase of 1° C. by 2050. 
 
This illustration serves to make one point very clearly:  In scenario A2, the GCMs concur 
that India‟s temperature will rise steadily as greenhouse gases accumulate in the 
atmosphere.  They also predict significant impacts on precipitation, but not consistently, 
and with different implications for extreme events.  A wetter India will experience more 
floods, while a drier India will have more droughts.  But in either case, it is critical to 
                                                 
3  IPCC (2000) characterizes A2 as follows: “A very heterogeneous world, characterized by self-reliance 
and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in 
high population growth. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic 
growth and technological change are more fragmented and slower than in other scenarios.” 
4  CSIRO is Australia‟s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (www.csiro.au/) 
5  NCAR is the US National Center for Atmospheric Research.  For a detailed description of the CCSM 
program, see http://www.ccsm.ucar.edu/about/. 
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note that a changed climate in the full scenario is associated with a changed country.  By 
2050, India has become a middle income country, whose per capita income, human 
resources and institutional capabilities give it much greater resilience in the face of 
weather changes.  
 
The Indian case reflects a more general and under-appreciated feature of scenario A2, as 
well as the other SRES scenarios:  Anticipated future emissions increases reflect the 
expectation that development will also continue.  By implication, many of the countries 
currently termed Low Income or Lower Middle Income by the World Bank will have 
departed that status by 2050. 
 
Tables 3a and 3b, calculated from the Hughes‟ (2009) projections, provide striking 
evidence of this shift for 94 countries identified as Low Income and Lower Middle 
Income by the World Bank in 2000.  Table 3a tracks the status of 56 Low Income 
Countries through the succeeding decades.  By 2050, 27 have moved to Lower Middle 
Income Status or higher.  Table 3b provides the same information for 38 countries 
identified as Lower Middle Income in 2000.  By 2050, only one has not advanced beyond 
that group. 
 
Table 4 provides related information on changes in life expectancy, which are linked to 
the population projections.  Life expectancy information is not available for two of the 
countries tabulated in Tables 3a and 3b.  During the present decade, 14 countries still 
have life expectancies between 41 and 50 years and 18 have life expectancies between 51 
and 60 years, while 29 have life expectancies above 70 years.  By 2050, the tabulation 
has reversed.  From 32 countries with life expectancies between 41 and 60 years in 2000-
2010, the number has dropped to 7.  And the number of countries with life expectancies 
greater than 70 has increased from 29 to 64.  
 
In summary, even our moderately optimistic projections entail very large changes for 
developing countries during the next four decades.  And, more importantly for this 
analysis, these changes are directly tied to the emissions scenario that generates the 
climate change problem.  Countries with much higher incomes and life expectancies will 
also have much greater willingness and ability to pay for protection from extreme 
weather events.  They will also have more highly-educated populations with much 
greater ability to avoid losses from adverse weather.  This turns out to have major 
consequences for our assessment of future risk, as we will see in the next section. 
 
4.  Development and Vulnerability to Extreme Weather Events 
 
As we noted in Section 2, extreme weather events have killed over 170,000 people and 
seriously affected billions since 1960.  A changing climate may carry even greater risks 
in the future.  But, as we noted above, changing development levels will also affect 
resilience in the face of weather shocks.  To determine the balance between worsening 
weather and growing resilience over time, we specify a model of weather-related impact 
risk and estimate it using panel data for the period 1960-2002.  Panel estimation allows 
for relatively clear interpretation of results, because it absorbs many sources of   6 
potentially-misleading cross-sectional correlation into estimated country effects.  At the 
same time, however, the need for lengthy time series limits the estimation variables to a 
sparse set.   
 
Our specification of the risk model incorporates three effects: economic development, 
weather, and education.  We focus on female education, for reasons that we explained in 
the introduction.  The formal specification is as follows for country i in period t: 
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where  R  =  Impact risk  (death from floods; affected by floods and droughts)  
  L  =  Total loss (persons killed or affected) 
  P  =  Population 
  G  =  GDP per capita 
  E  =  Female educational enrollment rate 
  R  =  Precipitation 
  T  =  Temperature 
  ε  =  A random error term 
 
Event-related losses are drawn from the CRED database; data on population, GDP per 
capita (in constant $US 2000) and education are drawn from the World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators.  We use constant-dollar GDP data to maximize the sample size 
for years prior to 1980.  Data on net female primary and secondary enrollment rates are 
limited to the period since 1990.  To extend the series for panel estimation, we “backcast” 
them using panel regressions that relate enrollment ratios to income per capita, life 
expectancy and the total fertility rate (see Section 5).  These associational regressions are 
a transformation of the conventional fertility equation, in which the total fertility rate is a 
function of income per capita, life expectancy and female schooling.  
 
We specify the education rates as flogs, to ensure that predictions are restricted to the 
interval 0-100%.  For a probability p between 0 and 1, the flog is defined as log [p/(1-p)].  
This is an appropriate specification for the regressions in any case, since it is consistent 
with natural lower and upper bounds for net enrollment rates.  These are, in effect, first-
stage regressions, with the total fertility rate, life expectancy and per capita income 
playing the role of instruments for second-stage estimation of the climate impact 
regressions.  Life expectancy is not significantly affected by deaths from floods, which 
are minuscule by comparison with deaths from other causes.  Therefore, use of this 
variable as a first-stage instrument should not lead to biased estimates for schooling in the 
regression for death from floods. 
 
Table 5 presents the fixed-effects estimation results, which are extremely robust in both 
regressions for the total fertility rate and life expectancy.  Per capita income is not a 
significant determinant of net female primary enrollment, but it has great explanatory 
power in the secondary enrollment regression. 
   7 
Prior experimentation has indicated that the appropriate functional form for equation (1) 
is log-linear, and that some climate indicators are much more robust than others.  In every 
case, mean rainfall is far more robust than either maximum or minimum rainfall, as well 
as other possible transformations (max/min ratio, etc.).  No measure of temperature 
(mean, maximum, minimum, max/min ratio, etc.) is significant in any of the three risk 
equations. 
 
Table 6 presents results for the risk of being killed or affected by floods, and affected by 
droughts.  Footnote 1 provides a detailed explanation of the criteria for determining 
persons affected.  Our instrumental variables approach creates high collinearity for 
primary and secondary enrollment ratios, so we estimate separate equations for primary 
and secondary schooling.  This serves our primary objective – inferring the schooling 
needed to neutralize future climate impacts – but raises the risk of upward bias in the 
separately-estimated impact of each schooling variable.  Such bias would lead to an 
ultimate under-estimate of schooling required to neutralize climate change (the higher the 
estimated effect of schooling on risk, the lower the schooling needed to neutralize 
additional risk from worsening weather).  However, we compensate for this by using the 
two sets of econometric results to calculate demands for primary and secondary education 
separately.  This introduces something akin to double-counting, thereby reducing or 
eliminating the effect of upward bias in the regressions themselves.   
 
The panel estimation results in Table 6 are quite robust for flooding risk, with all 
variables highly significant and all parameter signs consistent with prior expectations.  
Flood risk rises significantly as mean precipitation rises and falls significantly as per 
capita income rises.  The two schooling variables have highly-significant impacts of 
approximately equal magnitude:  Flood risk falls as female enrollment increases.  The 
results are much weaker for drought risk, partly because the smaller sample size reduces 
degrees of freedom for estimation.  GDP per capita is insignificant and has a perverse 
sign when it is included in these regressions, so we have excluded it from the estimates.  
Education and rainfall retain the correct signs, although only female primary enrollment 
is significant at 5%.  These are the maximum likelihood estimates in any case, and we 
need to project drought effects, so we retain the two drought equations in Table 6. 
 
To explore the implications of our results, we compare actual historical losses with a 
counterfactual case in which countries at each World Bank development level are 
assigned the same female primary enrollment ratio as the “best practice” country in the 
same World Bank class in the same year (e.g., all Low Income countries in 1985 are 
assigned the highest female primary enrollment ratio among Low Income countries in 
1985).  We perform this experiment to see how much difference feasible policy changes 
could have made for extreme weather risk.  As Table 7 and Figure 4 show, our results 
strongly indicate that more progressive policies would have made an enormous 
difference.  From 1970 to 1999, the CRED database records 153,079 deaths from floods 
in low income and lower middle income countries.  In our “best practice” counterfactual, 
by contrast, flood deaths number 91,541: 61,538 fewer people lose their lives.  For 
numbers affected, the estimated differences are very large.  From 1960 to 1999, the 
CRED database indicates that 2.12 billion people in developing countries were affected   8 
by floods.  In the counterfactual best practice case, this falls by 465 million to 1.65 
billion.  For droughts, the number affected falls by about 667 million – from 1.34 billion 
to 676 million.   
 
We conclude that a huge number of weather-related tragedies could have been averted if 
more developing countries had focused on progressive but feasible female education 
policies.  Countries that focused on female education suffered far fewer losses from 
extreme weather events than less-progressive countries with equivalent income and 
weather conditions.  It seems reasonable to assert that what has been true in the past will 
also be true in the future.  Given the significance of income and female education in 
determining vulnerability to extreme weather events, we would expect countries‟ future 
resilience to increase with economic growth and improvements in education. 
 
5.  Projecting Baseline Changes in Female Education 
 
The panel estimation results in Table 5 provide a reasonable basis for projecting the 
future paths of female primary and secondary education in each country, given our 
exogenous projections of income and population.  Our projections for life expectancy and 
the total fertility rate are taken directly from the UN‟s Medium Variant population 
forecast.  Given the paths of the three variables (life expectancy, total fertility rate, 
income per capita), we use the fixed-effects results reported in Table 5 to plot the paths of 
future net female primary and secondary enrollment rates.  Here it is worth repeating that 
we estimate both equations in Table 5 using flog transformations on net enrollment rates, 
which insure that projections are bounded in the range 0-100.  
 
To illustrate the implications of our approach, Table 8 presents projected future schooling 
rates by region.  We compute these rates in several steps.  First, we estimate the panel 
regressions, incorporating subregional dummies as well as country effects.
6  Then we 
combine the results with country projections of GDP per capita, life expectancy and the 
total fertility rate to predict future net female primary and secondary enrollment rates.  
We combine these rates with appropriate UN Medium Variant female population cohort 
data to calculate the actual number of females enrolled in primary and secondary school.  
Finally, we total enrolled females and relevant cohort females by region for primary and 
secondary schooling, and form the ratios to project regional primary and secondary 
enrollment ratios. 
 
Although our economic and demographic projections are “moderate” by current 
standards, they nevertheless entail continued rapid progress in female education.  By 
2050, Sub-Saharan Africa increases its net female primary enrollment rate from 54.9 to 
93.5, and its net female secondary enrollment rate from 19.7 to 78.0.  South Asia also 
makes rapid progress, moving its female primary and secondary enrollment rates from 
69.5 to 92.4 and 42.0 to 90.8, respectively.  East Asia/Pacific, Latin American/Caribbean 
and Middle East/North Africa also move upward, but proportionately less because they 
start from higher bases.  While educational progress is quite noteworthy in this scenario, 
                                                 
6  We include fixed effects for 25 subregions.   9 
it still falls well short of the Millennium Development Goals.  For example, Sub-Saharan 
Africa only approaches the MDG for female primary education by 2050. 
 
6.  Climate Change, Development and Future Vulnerability  
 
Now we turn our attention to simulating the future.  Our approach is identical to the 
counterfactual approach in Section 4, except that all of the righthand variables are 
projected for this exercise.  To get a clear sense of the stakes, we introduce several 
variants:  We estimate impacts with and without climate change, for both GCM climate 
projections, and with and without improvements in income and female education.  We 
introduce the latter variant to highlight the stark difference in results when only future 
emissions are counted, not the economic and human development that accompany those 
emissions.  As we have noted in Section 3, forty years hence many of today‟s low and 
lower middle income countries will have experienced major growth in income and female 
education.  Our panel results in Table 6 suggest that the latter changes will have a 
significant impact on climate vulnerability.  To assess the relevant magnitudes, we 
develop a detailed illustration for India that incorporates variations in the GCMs and 
development conditions.  
 
We focus on computed risks, or incidence probabilities, because they provide clear 
insight into the impact of model variables on projected future losses.  In each case, the 
relevant probability is multiplied by population to provide an overall loss estimate.  
India‟s population is projected to continue growing to about 1.66 billion people by 2050.  
Since the population is growing, even constant risk (measured as a loss probability) will 
translate to more losses when it is multiplied by the growing population. 
 
In Figure 5, our historical baseline for India is set at income per capita and life 
expectancy in 2000, and mean precipitation during the period 1995-2000.  The associated 
annual loss probabilities are .62 per million for being killed by a flood; 0.0039 for being 
affected by a flood; and .0509 for being affected by a drought.  From this baseline, we 
forecast the impact of GCM-projected changes in mean precipitation while holding 
income and life expectancy at their 2000 levels. The results, labeled “Static” in Figure 5, 
show the magnitudes of the projected impacts, as well as their directions.  NCAR is the 
wettest global scenario, and this is reflected in the Indian projections.  In the static NCAR 
case, the risk of death from flooding rises from 0.62 in 2000 to 0.66 in 2050.  Conversely, 
CSIRO, which produces the driest scenario, projects a drop in mean precipitation and an 
associated fall in flood-related death risk: from 0.62 in 2000 to 0.57 in 2050.   
 
Thus, holding economic and social development constant at 2000 levels, precipitation 
variations across GCMs include a range of about .09 per million in flood death risk.  In 
all cases, the deviation from current death risk is sufficiently small to be dominated by 
population growth in the assessment of losses.  Table 9 presents the relevant projections. 
In the Historical case, projected annual deaths increase from 626 to 1,023 (the risk of 
death remains constant, while population continues growing).  Projected annual deaths 
from flooding rise to 1,092 for NCAR, the wettest scenario, and fall to 950 for CSIRO, 
the driest.  Clearly, the differences are quite small in absolute terms:  By 2050, climate is   10 
responsible for 69 additional  flood-related deaths per year in the NCAR scenario, and 73 
fewer deaths in CSIRO.  For the entire fifty-year period, continuation of the historical 
climate pattern in a static India (at 2000 income per capita and educational enrollment 
rates) would yield 44,038 expected deaths from flooding.  In the static case, this rises to 
45,458 for the NCAR climate change scenario and falls to 41,325 for CSIRO.    
 
In comparison to these relatively small mortality effects, the number of people affected 
by floods is larger by one order of magnitude and people affected by droughts by two 
orders of magnitude.  For floods, the baseline probability of being affected (in the static-
India case with no climate change) is .0039.  This rises to .0043 for NCAR climate 
change and falls to .0035 for CSIRO.  These are much larger fractions than the death 
risks, and they translate to large absolute numbers.  Projected people affected annually 
rises from 4.0 million to 6.5 million in the baseline case (constant risk, population 
growth), rises to 7.2  million for NCAR (in a static India) and falls to 5.7 million for 
CSIRO.  Thus, the range of impacts is between 700,000 more people and 800,000 fewer 
people affected by floods.  The associated totals and differences in Table 9 are quite 
large: A fifty-year increase from the baseline of 15 million for NCAR (293.6 vs. 278.6 
million), and a decrease of 27.7 million for NCAR.  The numbers are larger by another 
order of magnitude for drought, but in the opposite direction.  For annual numbers 
affected by drought, the baseline case rises from 51.6 million in 2000 to 84.4 million in 
2050.  The numbers rise less rapidly in the NCAR (wet) case for a static India, to 77.1 
million and more rapidly for CSIRO (dry), to 93.4 million.  Translated to fifty-year totals, 
the differences are huge: 337 million more people affected for CSIRO, and 153 million 
fewer for NCAR. 
 
All of the cases discussed above have elements in common:  In an India that experiences 
no change in income and life expectancy, population growth alone (with constant loss 
risk) ensures that losses from extreme weather events increase substantially, even if there 
is no climate change.  The projected range of climate changes will alter the forecast, 
making it lower in some cases and higher in others.  But in the static-India case, all the 
scenarios project greater future losses, and climate effects that are smaller proportionally 
than anticipated effects from population change. 
 
Of course, all of the projections above are unrealistic, because they assume a static India 
that bears no resemblance to the India in the climate change forecasts.  As we have seen 
in a previous section, that India is quite close to present-day Chile in income and 
education levels by 2050.  Despite their unreality, we have included the static-India 
forecasts because we believe that they reflect the implicit assumptions in many current 
climate-impact analyses. 
 
For an instructive contrast, we now turn to projections that also utilize the fixed-effects 
estimates for equation (1), but incorporate our income and education projections for 
India.  Although we will review the numbers in some detail, the basic results are made 
graphically clear by the Development scenarios in Figure 5.  For flooding, in both NCAR 
and CSIRO scenarios, the probabilities of being killed or affected plunge so sharply that 
they dominate rising population in the calculation of total losses.  The result is many   11 
fewer deaths and people affected by floods in 2050, although there is still a climate affect 
at a much lower level.  A rapid fall is also evident for risk in the NCAR scenario for 
drought, although much less so for CSIRO.  
 
When we translate these risks into total losses, the results are quite striking.  The India of 
2050 has annual flooding deaths of about 461 for NCAR and CSIRO, vs. 1,023 in the 
baseline.  It has 3.6 million people affected by floods in NCAR and 2.8 million in 
CSIRO, vs. 6.5 million in the baseline.  In the case of droughts, 62.5 million are affected 
in NCAR and 75.7 million in CSIRO, vs. 84.4 million in the baseline. 
 
We draw two conclusions from these results.  First, it still makes sense to discuss 
financial support for adaptation to climate change in this context, because risks and losses 
can still be greater with climate change than without it.  But second, and perhaps more 
important, our results strongly indicate that the India of 2050 will suffer fewer losses 
from extreme weather after four more decades of climate change than present-day India 
suffers.   
 
For global perspective, we have included the same projection comparisons for all 
developing countries in Table 10.  Although the magnitudes are larger, they replicate the 
patterns that we have just discussed.  The developing world of 2050 may well suffer more 
losses with climate change than without it (the impact depends on whether the wet or dry 
scenario dominates), but the available evidence makes it very likely that it will suffer far 
fewer losses than presently in either case.  And our results for female education in 
equation (1) reinforce a fundamental point:  If we are really interested in reducing losses 
from climate events, assistance for greater resiliency now can make a huge difference.    
 
7.  Estimating The Cost of Adapting to Extreme Weather Events   
7.1  Data on Weather Emergency Preparedness Costs. 
 
Systematic work on the cost of adaptation to extreme weather events has been hindered 
by scanty data on the cost of measures for emergency preparedness.  A study of this type 
would be aided considerably by country-specific cost information for measures targeted 
on floods or droughts.  However, the representative information in Table 11 illustrates 
why we have not been able to employ such information.  Its entries have been extracted 
from country reports by the Asian Disaster Reduction Center.  The reports generally 
focus on summary information rather than specific information for emergency 
preparedness by type of disaster (e.g., floods, droughts). In the case of Japan, for 
example, much of the $34 billion expenditure is clearly for earthquake-related measures.  
The listed funds for Bangladesh are more than twice China‟s and four times Indonesia‟s, 
and they include both emergency food assistance and disaster management.  Much of the 
Indonesian fund undoubtedly relates to geologic disasters (earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, tsunamis) as well as weather-related disasters.   12 
Most reports do not provide time series information, nor do they go beyond reporting for 
single funds or national-level agencies.
7  Local expenditures are not included. 
 
In summary, the available data are far too spotty, non-specific, non-standardized, and 
temporally limited to permit estimation of  cost functions that could be used for 
projection.   In addition, they cover relatively few countries.  There is simply no way to 
construct a reasonable cost analysis from such information.    
 
7.2  The Education Alternative 
 
Since direct cost measures cannot be derived from the available data, we turn to an 
indirect approach.  As the panel results in Table 6 show, improvements in female 
education are powerfully associated with reductions in disaster risks once changes in 
weather and income are accounted for.  In this section, we exploit this relationship to 
address the adaptation cost question indirectly.    
 
Our approach applies straightforward algebra to equation (1).  Given an anticipated 
change in precipitation, we calculate the increase in education that will be just sufficient 
to restore the risk level prior to the precipitation change.  With subscripts B for the 
baseline case and N for the risk-neutralizing case, we impose the following constraint on 
the relevant elements of equation (1) (the others cancel because they remain unchanged):  
 
(2)  iB iB iN iN R E R E 3 2 3 2         
This yields the change in the educational enrollment rate that will neutralize the change in 
risk introduced by deviation of rainfall from the baseline case: 
(3)   ] [
2
3
iB iN iB iN i R R E E E      


  (β2<0, β3>0) 
For each education level, we calculate ΔEi for persons killed by floods, persons affected 
by floods, and persons affected by droughts.  Adopting a conservative approach, we only 
consider positive ΔEi.
8  We compute the 50-year sum of positive ΔEi for each of the three 
risks and, in keeping with our conservative approach, we choose the risk for which the 
sum is largest.    
 
                                                 
7  Our thanks to Tim Essam for his help with gathering this information. 
8  In a wetter climate regime the number of people killed and affected by floods will rise, but the number 
affected by droughts will fall.  The converse is true for a dryer regime.  A complete accounting would 
therefore involve calculation of net impacts (losses from flooding vs. losses from droughts)  But in the case 
of floods, such an exercise would require assigning relative weights to being killed and being affected 
(injured, rendered homeless, or requiring temporary assistance).  It would also require the assignment of 
relative weights to the affects of floods and droughts.  Rather than adopt arbitrary weights, we take the 
conservative approach and use the greatest change in enrollment ratio across the three risk categories.        13 
7.3  The Cost of Climate Change Neutralization 
 
Now we are ready to compute the cost of neutralizing the risk impact of more extreme 
weather events via increased schooling for young women.  Once we have chosen the 
appropriate  ΔEi for each schooling level in each country, computing the associated 
incremental cost involves two steps.  First, we obtain the number of new students by 
multiplying ΔEi (as a percent) by the number of females in the appropriate age cohort.
9  
Then we multiply by projected expenditure per pupil.  To compute projected unit 
expenditures, we have drawn on the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators to 
estimate panel regressions for primary and secondary expenditures per student as a 
proportion of gdp per capita.  After extensive experimentation with available and 
plausible righthand variables (e.g., per capita income, size of student population, time 
trend), we find significance only for country, subregional and regional fixed effects.  We 
use all three sets of fixed effects to get the most accurate estimates for countries that have 
no unit expenditure data in the WDI.  Then we apply the country estimates to projected 
per capita income to obtain predicted expenditures per primary and secondary student by 
year.  We combine these with the calculated numbers of primary and secondary students 
required for “climate change neutralization” to obtain our estimate of the public cost. 
 
Table 12 provides a set of illustrative results for three countries in different regions that 
have comparatively low baseline female enrollment rates: Republic of Congo, Nepal and 
Nicaragua.  For ease of interpretation, we present results at ten-year intervals, beginning 
in 2010.  The results highlight the global diversity that interacts with the GCM 
projections.  Overall costs are higher for CSIRO in Congo and Nepal, and for NCAR in 
Nicaragua; we focus on the higher-cost scenario for each country.  Here it is useful to 
recall that these are adjustments from a baseline in which the countries continue their 
socioeconomic development.  Weather impact risks decline as income and life 
expectancy increase.  The numbers in Table 12 reflect the deviations from this baseline, 
which assumes no climate change. 
 
In Congo, neutralizing the effect of climate change in the CSIRO scenario requires 4.700 
additional females in primary school in 2010, along with 4,100 additional female students 
in secondary school.  The associated annual schooling costs for primary and secondary 
students are $97 and $233, respectively.  When these are applied to the schooling 
increments, the result is an additional expenditure of $1.4 million in 2010.  The numbers 
increase steadily through 2040.  In that year, the addition to schooling is 32,900 primary 
students and 32,400 secondary students which, at projected unit costs of $218 and $524, 
yields a total expenditure of $24.2 million.  Projected short-term moderation of climate 
impact after 2040 reduces the numbers in 2050.   
 
In Nepal, the number of needed additional students in the CSIRO (higher-cost) scenario 
is far greater than for the Congo and the unit costs substantially lower.  When combined, 
the two factors yield climate-neutralizing costs that increase from $5.9 million in 2010 to 
$27.2 million in 2040, then fall to $26.5 million in 2050.  The NCAR scenario is more 
                                                 
9 Our primary-school cohort is young women in age group 5-9, plus half of young women 10-14.  Our 
secondary cohort is half the age group 10-14, plus the age group 15-19.    14 
potentially-damaging for Nicaragua than CSIRO.  Neutralizing the impact of NCAR-
projected change requires the addition of 35,900 young women to primary schooling and 
69,400 to secondary schooling in 2010.  The total cost is $5.9 million in 2010, increasing 
to $13.5 million in 2050.
10 
 
Table 13 summarizes our results at the regional level.  Here the scale of effort needed for 
climate neutralization becomes apparent.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the overall impacts of 
CSIRO and NCAR are roughly similar.  For both GCM scenarios, the requisite annual 
expenditure rises from about $200 million in 2010 to over $2 billion in 2050.  By the 
latter date, climate neutralization in CSIRO requires 1.7 million additional primary 
school students and 3.5 million additional secondary students.  In the NCAR case, these 
numbers rise to 3.0 million primary students and 7.1 million secondary students.  The 
Sub-Saharan case points to another feature of geographic diversity that has implications 
for the cost of climate neutralization.  Climate changes in the two scenarios have different 
geographic distributions.  In the African case, by happenstance, the countries most 
adversely affected in NCAR have significantly lower unit schooling costs than the 
countries with the greatest effects in CSIRO.  As a result, climate-neutralizing 
expenditure is slightly lower in NCAR, even though the number of additional students is 
substantially higher. 
 
South Asia is also not far from cost parity in the two climate scenarios. Although the 
expenditure difference is large in 2010 -- $529 million in CSIRO vs. $266 million in 
NCAR – by 2050 the numbers are proportionally much closer ($5.4 billion and $4.9 
billion, respectively).  Other regions exhibit disparities, but with different patterns.  East 
Asia and the Pacific Islands are dominated by China, whose rising prosperity generates 
steadily-increasing schooling costs.  Costs in the CSIRO scenario dominate until 2040, 
when a projected climate shift significantly moderates climate stress during the same 
period that it increases in NCAR.  The result is a reversal for CSIRO, as regional 
expenditures fall from $2.1 billion in 2040 to $796 million in 2050, while NCAR 
expenditures continue expanding, from $1.7 billion to $2.6 billion.  In the remaining 
three regions, NCAR dominates expenditures in varying degrees.   
 
Table 14 summarizes the annual results, which tell a story of impressive magnitudes.  
Overall, annual expenditures are remarkably close for CSIRO and NCAR until 2040.  
Climate-neutralizing educational expenditure is about $1.6 billion for both in 2010.  By 
2040, NCAR is slightly ahead ($9.5 billion vs. $9.2 billion).  Projected short-run climate 
shifts and a host of other factors shift the balance by 2050, and NCAR finishes well 
ahead of CSIRO ($13.6 billion annually, vs. $10.9 billion).  In both scenarios, the 
implications for climate-neutralizing female education are massive.  By 2050, 
neutralizing CSIRO requires 7 million additional young women in primary school and 
11.3 million in secondary school.  The corresponding numbers for NCAR are 8.3 million 
and 14.9 million.    
 
                                                 
10 Like many countries in Latin America, Nicaragua is reported by the World Development Indicators as 
spending more per capita on primary students than on secondary students.  The results for Nicaragua in 
Table 12 reflect this disparity.   15 
Table 16 provides a final summary by totaling annual expenditures for the period 2002-
2050
11 at varying discount rates.  Overall, at a 0 discount rate, impact-neutralizing 
expenditures for additional female education are $279.4 billion for CSIRO and $288.1 
billion for NCAR.  The totals fall sharply as the discount rate increases.  At 7%, present 
values in 2002 are $40.2 billion for CSIRO and $39.5 billion for NCAR.  Among the 
world‟s regions, it is both clear and unsurprising that the largest climate-neutralizing 
expenditures are in the areas whose low incomes and schooling rates are associated with 
higher climate impact risks.  South Asia has the greatest expenditure in both climate 
scenarios, with CSIRO much more costly than NCAR ($121.2 billion vs. $89.7 billion for 
a zero discount rate).  Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia/Pacific Islands are in the next 
rank, with rough balance across the two scenarios:  Around $46 billion for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and $55 billion for East Asia/Pacific.  In the next rank, both Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia and Latin America/Caribbean have NCAR expenditures about twice 
as high as CSIRO expenditures.  The pattern reverses for Middle East/North Africa, 
where expenditures are $15.7 billion for CSIRO and $12.9 billion for NCAR. 
 
8.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have addressed several questions that are relevant for the international 
discussion of adaptation to climate change:  How will climate change alter the incidence 
of these events, and how will their impact be distributed geographically?  How will future 
socioeconomic development affect the vulnerability of affected communities?  And, of 
primary interest to negotiators and donors, how much would it cost to neutralize the 
threat of additional losses in this context?   
 
From a narrow technical perspective, it might be desirable to address the latter question 
with a detailed engineering cost analysis of specific disaster prevention measures.  
However, as we show in the paper, existing cross-country information about relevant 
emergency preparedness programs is far too sparse to support systematic analysis and 
projection.  And in any case, we believe that the effectiveness of such measures is 
contingent on the characteristics of the communities that employ them.  We therefore 
adopt an alternative approach in this paper, focusing on the role of socioeconomic 
development in increasing climate resilience.  Drawing on extensive research, our 
approach highlights the importance of  female education and empowerment in reducing 
weather-related loss risks.  Our cost analysis asks two key questions:  As climate change 
increases potential vulnerability to extreme weather events, how many additional young 
women would have to be educated to neutralize this increased vulnerability?  And how 
much would it cost? 
 
Our study relies heavily on fixed-effects estimation of risk equations that link losses from 
floods and droughts during the period 1960-2003 to three basic determinants: weather 
events that increase potential losses, income per capita, and female education.  We 
estimate separate equations for the risk of death from a flood, the risk of being affected 
                                                 
11  A few missing value problems prevent generation of fully-comparable numbers for 2000 and 2001.   16 
by a flood, and the risk of being affected by a drought (the data are too sparse to support 
estimation for death from droughts).    
 
Our analysis combines the estimated risk equations with projections of economic growth 
and population change, along with accompanying changes in primary and secondary 
schooling.  We develop three scenarios:  A baseline in which socioeconomic 
development continues but the climate does not change, and two scenarios with the same 
baseline development path but alternative weather paths driven by particularly “wet” and 
“dry” GCMs.  For each GCM scenario, we calculate the associated changes in the risks of 
death from floods and being affected by floods or droughts.  Then, choosing the worst-
case risk, we calculate the increase in female schooling that would neutralize this 
additional risk.  We multiply the results by expenditures per student to estimate the total 
educational investment required to neutralize the additional weather risk posed by climate 
change.   
 
Our approach is conservative, in the sense that it is very unlikely to underestimate the 
required investment.  First, we base our cost assessment on general preparedness via 
increased education, rather than more narrowly-targeted investment in emergency 
preparedness.  Second, we base our cost calculation on worst-case risk scenarios, which 
require the greatest increase in schooling to neutralize.  Third, we incorporate only 
projected increases in vulnerability, not decreases.  As an alternative, for example, we 
could perform a net impact analysis for a wet climate scenario that would subtract 
expected decreased losses from drought from expected increased losses from flooding.  
Fourth, our analysis employs the two GCMs (among approximately twenty) that generate 
the wettest and driest scenarios at the global scale.  Other GCMs would generate more 
moderate intermediate results.  Finally, we do not average across the two GCMs, which 
would have the effect of neutralizing their extreme signals. 
 
In summary, we believe that our approach is sufficiently conservative to create a strong 
upward bias in our cost estimation.
12  It is certainly possible that the “true” cost of 
adaptation to extreme weather events is lower than our estimates, but we very much 
doubt that it is higher. 
 
At the same time, our approach offers significant co-benefits because female education 
has a much broader sphere of potential influence than direct investment in emergency 
                                                 
12  One potential caveat relates to disparities between male and female enrollment rates.  Where female 
rates are significantly lower than male rates, climate-neutralizing increases in female education are not 
likely to produce female enrollment rates higher than their male counterparts before the latter reach 100%.  
In this case, increases in female education would also be defensible on equal-opportunity grounds.  In the 
converse case – in which climate-neutralizing increases would actually raise female enrollment rates above 
their male counterparts at some future point – there might well be pressure for subsequent matching 
increases in male enrollment.  In this case, our approach would underestimate full educational costs for the 
countries in question (although it would remain conservative in all other dimensions).  However, it is 
important to note that our benchmark forecasts already incorporate rapid expansion of educational 
enrollments in all poor countries.  And in many of these countries, large enrollment rate disparities imply 
that male-parity claims would not be a problem because male enrollment would reach 100% long before 
female enrollment.  Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our approach could underestimate full educational 
costs for some countries.  Our thanks to Nancy Birdsall for raising this issue.   17 
preparedness.  As the development literature has noted for many years, educating young 
women is one of the major determinants (indeed, some would argue, the major 
determinant) of sustainable development.  A disaster-prevention approach that focuses on 
investment in female education therefore has an expected social rate of return on other 
margins that probably warrants the exercise, even if the expected benefits in reduced 
disaster vulnerability are overstated (and in fact, we believe the opposite to be true).   
 
Our analysis has generated a set of estimates for required female schooling and 
associated costs by GCM scenario, country and year.  Variations in projected climatic, 
socioeconomic and demographic variables are more than sufficient to produce wide 
disparities in outcomes by 2050, even among countries within the same region.  At the 
country and regional levels, neither climate scenario dominates in all cases.  The “wet” 
scenario generates higher risk-neutralizing expenditure on female schooling in come 
countries and regions; the “dry” scenario is more costly in others.  Among regions, South 
Asia requires the most expenditure in both climate scenarios, followed by Sub-Saharan 
Africa and East Asia, and then more distantly by the other regions. 
 
At both regional and global levels, we find an impressive scale for the requisite increases 
in female education expenditure.  By mid-century, neutralizing the impact of extreme 
weather events requires educating an additional 18 to 23 million young women at a cost 
of $11 to $14 billion annually.  For the period 2000-2050 as a whole, both GCM 
scenarios entail about $280 billion in additional expenditure.  The present value of these 
expenditures is substantially reduced by time-discounting, even at modest rates, but the 
basic result stands:  In the developing world, neutralizing the impact of worsening 
weather over the coming decades will require educating a large new cohort of young 
women at a cost that will steadily escalate to several billions of dollars annually.  
However, it will be enormously worthwhile on other margins to invest in education for 
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Table 1:  Losses From Extreme Weather Events: 












Source: CRED (EM-DAT) 
 












Source: CRED (EM-DAT) 
Country  Year  Deaths 
India  1965  500,000 
India  1966  500,000 
India  1967  500,000 
Ethiopia  1984  300,000 
Ethiopia  1974  200,000 
Sudan  1984  150,000 
Mozambique  1984  100,000 
Ethiopia  1973  100,000 
Somalia  1974  19,000 
 




Period  Floods  Droughts  Floods  Droughts 
1960-69  17.0  1,510.1  34,256  110,000 
1970-79  46.4  319.1  200,000  460,000 
1980-89  50.3  556.9  480,000  700,000 
1990-99  58.5  0.8  1,400,000  190,000 
         
Total  172.2  2,386.9  2,114,256  1,460,000 
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2001-2010  38  0  38 
2011-2020  26  12  38 
2021-2030  11  27  38 
2031-2040  7  31  38 
2041-2050  1  37  38 
 
 
Table 4:  Year 2000 Low Income and Lower Middle Income Countries: 
      Changes in Life Expectancy Through 2050 
 
  Life Expectancy at Birth 
Decade  41-50  51-60  61-70  71-80  81-90  Total 
2001-2010  14  18  31  29  0  92 
2011-2020  8  18  31  35  0  92 
2021-2030  4  18  20  50  0  92 
2031-2040  0  14  22  55  1  92 

















2001-2010  56  0  0  56 
2011-2020  49  7  0  56 
2021-2030  42  14  0  56 
2031-2040  34  22  0  56 
2041-2050  29  24  3  56   21 
 
Table 5:  Determinants of Net Female Enrollment Ratios 
 
Dependent Variable: Flog Net Enrollment Rate 
 
                                                    (1)                   (2) 
  Primary    Secondary 
Total Fertility Rate  -0.349  -0.555 
  (7.35)**  (14.87)** 
Life Expectancy  0.068  0.043 
  (6.04)**  (6.51)** 
Log GDP Per Capita  0.139  0.893 
  (1.34)  (10.67)** 
Constant  -1.774  -5.213 
  (1.39)  (8.14)** 
Observations  1849  1025 
R-squared  0.89  0.98 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 6:  Weather Risk Model: Fixed-Effects Estimates 
 
Dependent Variables [Log(Variable/Population)] 
 
     (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)  (5)              (6) 
  Floods  Floods  Floods         Floods       Droughts    Droughts 
  Killed  Killed          Affected      Affected     Affected      Affected 
Female Primary  -0.018    -0.017    -0.020   
 Enrollment Rate  (4.67)**    (2.70)**    (2.05)*   
Female Secondary    -0.017    -0.015    -0.011 
 Enrollment Rate    (5.36)**    (2.87)**    (1.16) 
GDP Per Capita  -0.137  -0.122  -0.120  -0.107     
 ($‟000)  (6.22)**  (5.46)**  (2.91)**  (2.53)*     
Precipitation  0.010  0.010  0.016  0.016  -0.013  -0.014 
 (mm.)  (3.28)**  (3.23)**  (3.61)**  (3.60)**  (1.75)  (1.79) 
Constant  -12.833  -13.438  -6.630  -7.297  -0.883  -1.752 
  (28.38)**  (36.28)**  (9.29)**  (12.92)**  (1.08)  (2.67)** 
Observations  933  929  1051  1047  323  322 
Countries  120  120  134  134  83  82 
R-squared  0.46  0.46  0.41  0.42  0.54  0.53 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
     
 Table 7:  Historical and Simulated “Best Practice” Weather-Related Losses 








Table 8:  Projected Net Female Primary and Secondary Enrollment Ratios by Region 













Table 9:  Alternative Scenarios for India, 2000-2050 
 




Affected by Floods 
(Million) 
Affected by Droughts 
(Million) 
    CSIRO  NCAR  Historical  CSIRO  NCAR  Historical  CSIRO  NCAR  Historical 
2000    626.1  626.1  626.1  4.0  4.0  4.0  51.6  51.6  51.6 
2050  Static  950.4  1,092.3  1,023.4  5.7  7.2  6.5  93.4  77.1  84.4 
2050  Devel  461.0  461.0  1,023.4  2.8  3.6  6.5  75.7  62.5  84.4 
Totals                     
2000-50  Static  41,325.2  45,457.6  44,038.4  250.9  293.6  278.6  3,967.4  3,477.1  3,630.2 
2000-50  Devel  27,768.1  30,269.3  44,038.4  176.7  204.1  278.6  3,362.6  2,956.4  3,630.2 
  
Table 10: Alternative Scenarios for Developing Countries, 2000-2050 
 




Affected by Floods 
(Million) 
Affected by Droughts 
(Million) 
    CSIRO  NCAR  Historical  CSIRO  NCAR  Historical  CSIRO  NCAR  Historical 
2000    5,520  5,520  5,520  16.4  16.4  16.4  142.7  142.7  142.7 
2050  Static  10,861  11,018  10,871  24.6  27.1  25.5  262.2  241.6  250.5 
2050  Devel  3,425  3,464  10,871  8.3  9.3  25.5  184.8  169.2  250.5 
Totals                     
2000-50  Static  419,849  427,755  423,185  1,054  1,140  1,102  10,690  10,116  10,304 












Flood Deaths  153,079  91,541  61,538  40.2% 
Floods Affected ('000)  2,116,243  1,651,065  465,178  22.0% 

























Year  P  S  P  S  P  S  P  S  P  S 
2000  54.9  19.7  95.0  80.5  90.8  61.3  80.5  56.0  69.5  42.0 
2010  68.7  28.5  96.9  86.5  93.3  73.1  89.1  67.4  81.3  60.5 
2020  78.0  43.8  97.8  89.9  94.9  81.1  92.9  77.6  85.8  73.5 
2030  86.0  59.4  98.2  93.0  96.0  85.8  94.9  84.7  88.8  81.9 
2040  90.8  70.9  98.6  94.8  96.9  89.6  96.1  89.3  90.7  87.2 
2050  93.5  78.0  98.8  96.2  97.4  92.1  96.9  92.1  92.4  90.8   24 














Armenia  Emergency Management Administration  2006  7.0 
Bangladesh  Food and Disaster Management Budget  Annual  500.0 
China  Various agencies  2005  217.7 
Indonesia  Contingency budget for disaster response  Annual  125.8 
India  Calamity Relief Fund  2000-2005  5.1 
Japan  Budget for disaster risk reduction  Annual  34,000.0 
Kazakhstan  For debris flows  1999  200.0 
Republic of Korea  National Emergency Management Agency  Annual  300.0 
Thailand  Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation  2003  25.6 
Thailand  Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation  2006  63.9 
Thailand  Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation  2005  46.0 
Thailand  Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation  2004  32.4 
Mongolia  Total Buget  2006  12.5 
Malaysia  Disaster Relief Fund  Annual  15.5 
Nepal  Emergency Fund  2006  0.015 
Pakistan  Ten Year Perspective Development Plan  2001-2011  18.8 
Philippines  National Calamity Fund  2005  12.8 
Russian Federation  Fund for prevention and elimination of emergency 
situations  2003  687.4 
Tajikistan  activities for disaster management  Annual  5.5 
 
Source: Asian Disaster Reduction Center, Country Reports 
              http://www.adrc.asia/   25 
 Table 12:  Climate-Neutralizing Female Education - Students and Costs 















































  Republic of Congo 
2010  1,399  0  4.7  4.1  0.0  0.0  97  233 
2020  4,341  0  10.5  9.8  0.0  0.0  128  307 
2030  11,868  4,729  21.9  20.9  8.7  8.3  164  395 
2040  24,179  16,055  32.9  32.4  21.8  21.5  218  524 
2050  23,501  23,501  24.8  24.7  24.8  24.7  280  672 
  Nepal 
2010  5,935  0  93.6  88.4  0.0  0.0  32  33 
2020  15,059  0  182.5  183.7  0.0  0.0  40  42 
2030  27,796  500  274.9  262.4  4.9  4.7  51  53 
2040  27,237  9,382  198.8  204.6  68.5  70.5  66  69 
2050  26,494  14,319  151.4  154.8  81.8  83.7  85  88 
  Nicaragua 
2010  0  5,889  0.0  0.0  35.9  69.4  89  39 
2020  0  12,343  0.0  0.0  37.0  155.3  118  51 
2030  1,788  12,488  6.1  11.8  27.7  116.9  159  69 
2040  9,425  12,911  21.6  46.0  21.6  81.4  226  99 
2050  3,695  13,549  6.4  12.4  17.8  58.3  313  137 
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Table 13:  Climate-Neutralizing Female Education - Students and Costs 










































































Year  Sub-Saharan Africa 
2010  179,036  211,757  800  880  981  974 
2020  562,746  672,806  1,847  2,258  2,422  2,508 
2030  1,001,736  1,044,923  2,117  2,843  3,038  4,262 
2040  1,680,756  1,623,282  2,038  3,311  3,383  6,481 
2050  2,294,642  2,203,969  1,708  3,488  2,967  7,053 
  South Asia 
2010  528,691  266,339  2,264  2,603  990  1,020 
2020  1,567,993  784,403  4,354  5,277  1,961  2,024 
2030  2,983,226  1,771,123  5,129  7,143  2,960  3,139 
2040  4,101,156  3,502,443  4,470  6,040  3,752  4,056 
2050  5,446,895  4,853,930  4,277  5,357  3,539  3,681 
  East Asia and Pacific Islands 
2010  339,783  397,749  1,100  1,237  872  1,276 
2020  883,470  1,019,321  1,423  2,580  1,561  1,984 
2030  1,352,575  1,312,094  990  2,681  1,130  1,635 
2040  2,104,735  1,723,739  768  3,367  820  1,554 
2050  795,767  2,636,736  241  1,315  780  2,307 
  Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
2010  112,192  150,593  200  246  214  313 
2020  339,834  479,968  419  436  459  561 
2030  417,795  727,301  301  359  375  561 
2040  476,751  868,335  216  265  311  429 
2050  524,959  1,554,609  148  156  345  447 
  Middle East and North Africa 
2010  60,080  32,367  114  147  46  93 
2020  171,062  95,127  269  318  101  205 
2030  327,340  226,553  255  339  135  259 
2040  573,419  443,764  232  322  181  312 
2050  891,987  958,291  219  323  244  372 
  Latin America and the Caribbean 
2010  396,497  513,496  465  597  619  959 
2020  1,016,825  1,266,047  555  1,486  929  1,928 
2030  617,302  1,187,125  412  833  700  1,687 
2040  218,728  1,370,353  200  644  526  1,445 
2050  962,013  1,396,755  365  703  407  1,032   27 
Table 14: Climate-Neutralizing Female Education 





































2010  1,616,279  1,572,299  4,943  5,710  3,721  4,634 
2020  4,541,929  4,317,672  8,867  12,355  7,433  9,209 
2030  6,699,975  6,269,119  9,203  14,199  8,339  11,542 
2040  9,155,545  9,531,917  7,923  13,948  8,973  14,278 
2050  10,900,000  13,600,000  6,959  11,341  8,282  14,892 
 
 
Table 15: Climate-Neutralizing Female Education, 2002-2050 
                 Global and Regional Costs: Selected Discount Rates 










East Asia and 
Pacific Islands 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 




  CSIRO  NCAR  CSIRO  NCAR  CSIRO  NCAR  CSIRO  NCAR  CSIRO  NCAR  CSIRO  NCAR  CSIRO  NCAR 
0  279.4  288.1  46.4  47.0  53.8  57.7  15.8  30.2  26.5  50.6  15.7  12.9  121.2  89.7 
3  110.3  111.1  17.1  17.8  21.7  23.2  6.6  11.7  13.0  22.3  5.7  4.4  46.1  31.7 
5  64.5  64.1  9.5  10.1  12.8  13.8  4.0  6.8  8.8  14.0  3.2  2.3  26.2  17.1 
7  40.2  39.5  5.7  6.1  8.0  8.8  2.6  4.2  6.2  9.3  1.9  1.3  15.8  9.8 
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Figure 1:  Trends in Risks From Extreme Events, 1960-2000 
  (Source: CRED: EM-DAT) 
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Figure 2:  Number Affected by Droughts in Developing Countries, 1960-2002 
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Figure 4:  Extreme Weather Losses, 1970-1999 
         Historical and Best Practice 
 
\ 
Affected by Droughts (‘000)
Killed by Floods


























1970 1980 1990 2000
Affected by Droughts (‘000)
Killed by Floods


























1970 1980 1990 2000
 
   33 






































































































































2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
CSIRO
Development
NCAR
Development
NCAR
Static
Historical
CSIRO
Static
 